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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper extends recent research into the long term pricing impacts of the American 
Airlines and US Airways merger in 2013.  Zhang and Nozick (2018), using the 10% 
ticket sample, demonstrated that low cost carriers’ post-merger lowered prices for non-
stop service post-merger and those reductions in fare were the largest where American 
Airlines and US Airways were more prominent pre-merger. The paper extends their 
analysis to include multi-hop service, the impact of hubs and focus cities, and to address 
the feedback between prices and market concentration by introducing population and 
income into the statistical models. The estimated models again show that (1) legacy 
carriers were able to raise prices after the merger and the amount of the increase was 
larger where American and US Airways played a smaller role in the market pre-merger; 
and (2) low cost carriers reduced their prices and the amount of the reduction was also 
heavily influenced by the role that US Airways and American Airlines played in the 
market pre-merger.  For the legacy carriers these trends have generally increased across 
2015, 2016 and 2017.  For the low cost carriers, the reductions in price over these three 
years have generally decreased.  Finally, we find that where service is provided using 
airports that are hubs or focus cities, prices are generally higher and that impact is more 
pronounced in 2016 and 2017 in contrast to 2015.  
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INTRODUCTION 
There has been a burst of airline mergers in the past three decades caused by the intense 
competition that has emerged between carriers since the deregulation of the air 
transportation industry in 1978 [1].  Only four of seven transcontinental legacy carriers 
in the U.S. remained by the early 2010s as a result of airline restructuring post de-
regulation. In 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice approved the merger of American 
Airlines and US Airways creating the world’s largest airlines. Merged carriers generally 
benefit post-merger through increases in operating efficiencies as well as improved 
market power. While increased efficiency leads to lower marginal costs, prices often 
rise post-merger because of the reduction in competition and therefore the increased 
pricing power of the merged carrier. 
 
Many studies have found statistically significant relationships between mergers and 
airfares. Early research [2] identified fare increases that were shown to be correlated 
with mergers in the air market from 1985 to1988. Focused on the merger wave between 
2009 and 2012, [3] examined the short-term pricing impacts and estimated an overall 
2.3% to 5.9% increase in ticket prices. However, as described in [4], each merger has 
had their distinctive price impacts that are associated with the market characteristics and 
the level of competition present before and after the merger.  
 
Competitive effects in the airline market have been the subject of many studies. [5] 
examined the competitive impacts of low-cost carriers on legacy carriers. As shown in 
[6] and [7], entrance of low-cost carriers is associated with significantly lower airfares. 
In addition to the association of increased pricing with the presence of actual 
competitors in the market, the concept of potential competition, defined as carriers that 
do not serve a specific route but provide air service at either or both endpoints of the 
route, has been investigated in recent studies with promising results. [7] compared the 
effect of actual and potential competitors and found they are both associated with a 
reduction in fares, especially when there is potential competition at both endpoints. [8][9] 
also showed downward pricing pressure when a low-cost carrier entered the market. [10] 
showed empirically that potential entrants have a stronger effect in competitive 
environments in comparison with monopoly markets. [11] empirically demonstrated the 
substantial impacts of potential competition by low-cost carriers in both nonstop and 
multi-stop markets.  
 
[12] empirically demonstrates the impact of the US Airways and American Airlines 
merger on the pricing of non-stop air fares in the United States using the 10% ticket 
sample made available by the Department of Transportation.  They focused their 
analysis on a comparison of ticket prices in 2011 with prices in 2015 and 2016. They 
integrate into their analysis the effects of within market actual and potential competition 
as well as the differing impacts of legacy and low cost carriers as was developed in [13]. 
They show that the new American Airlines increased fares. They also showed that other 
legacy carriers were also able to increase fares and that these increases where the higher 
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when US airways and American had a smaller presence pre-merger.  In contrast low 
cost carriers generally reduced prices post-merger and these reductions were the largest 
when American and US airways played a larger role pre-merger.   
 
We extend that analysis to consider multi-stop service as well as the impact of hubs and 
focus cities on carrier pricing.  [12] did include the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) 
as a measure of market concentration.  Since there may be a feedback effect between 
pricing market concentration [13] we include population and income as an aid in 
resolving the impacts of this feedback. These same variables have also been shown to 
be useful in [4]- [10]. We also extend the pricing comparison to 2017.  
 
Next section describes the data used in the modeling and analysis. Based on that data, 
the next section describes the variables considered and the resultant models developed. 
The third section provides and analyzes the insights generated by the models. The final 
section offers conclusions and directions for future research. 
DATA, VARIABLES AND MODELS 
Following the previous studies, we use the Airline Origin and Destination Survey 
(DB1B) from the U.S. Department of Transportation as data source for market-based 
pricing information. DB1B is a quarterly based dataset that is a ten percent sample of 
virtually all airline tickets with information about each OD pair in the air market. We 
focus on the calendar year 2011, which is prior to the American Airlines-US Airways 
merger, and three consecutive years’ post-merger (2015, 2016, 2017) for analysis. As 
of this writing the fourth quarter of 2017 is not available hence for 2017 our focus is on 
the first three quarters. We use three years’ post-merger in an effort to understand what 
short terms pricing impacts are and what longer terms pricing impacts are. 
 
We consider both roundtrip and one-way tickets that cost between $10 and $2,000. 
These restrictions are the same as in [12] [14]. [15] uses a lower bound price of $25. 
Roundtrip tickets in the dataset are treated as two separated one-way tickets. We 
explicitly consider four legacy carriers and seven low cost carriers. The legacy carriers 
are American Airlines, US Airways, Delta and United. The low cost carriers considered 
are Jet Blue, Frontier, Southwest, Spirit, Allegiant, Sun Country and Virgin Airlines. 
These are the same carriers considered in [12]. We include all airports in the United 
States that provide service from at least one of the 11 carriers considered.  This is about 
400 airports. In 2011, American, US Airways, United, and Delta served 25,562, 24,554, 
38,351, 46,216 markets, respectively. Across the seven low cost carriers another 12,652 
markets were served that year.  By 2017 the new American Airlines, United, and Delta 
served 46,888, 35,808 and 42,089 markets in the centennial United States. 13,884 
markets had service from at least one of the seven low cost carriers. 
 
As in [12] we measure market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) and whether or not an airport at one or both ends of a market are slot constrained. 
HHI is a well-accepted measure that explicitly considers the distribution in the size of 
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the competitors in a market. We extend the analysis in [12] by including one stop and 
multi-stop service in addition to nonstop service. 
 
The use of an airport as a hub or a focus city within a carrier’s network can influence 
airfares at that airport. As argued in [16], dominant carriers at hub airports may have 
more freedom in setting fare with advantages such as building connection with local 
industry/government and travel agencies. Also, by offering frequent flyer programs or 
other attractive plans, passengers are more likely to be willing to pay more to receive 
their services. [17] represented hub effects through the specification of a binary variable. 
If either endpoint on a route was a hub airport the variable took on a value of one, 
otherwise it was zero. [11] measured service concentration by a carrier providing service 
in a market by calculating the weighted average of that carrier’s passenger shares at the 
market’s two endpoints. We develop a related measure to characterize the degree to 
which a carrier is using an airport as a hub.  For each carrier and airport, we compute 
the percentage of their passengers that transfer flights at an airport (in contrast to their 
using that airport as an origination or destination).   For each carrier and itinerary, we 
average these percentages across all airports used. 
 
As noted in other studies, airfare is impacted by demographic and socioeconomic 
conditions around the airports that define the market (e.g. [11] and [16]). Generally, a 
larger population and higher incomes leads to increased demand for passenger air travel. 
However, higher densities of passengers originating or terminating at an airport can lead 
to cost savings allowing for reductions in fares [11]. To measure population, we use 
population in the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) where the airport is located [19].  
For each market, we use the logarithm of the product of the population at the market 
endpoints.  
 
Others have used related measures for population. For example, [3] used the product of 
the population of the originating and terminating airports, [17] took the square root of 
the product of the populations. [10] and [14] used the sum of the populations at the 
originating and terminating airports. For income, we use per capita income at the 
market’s origin city; which is consistent with [16].  
 
We explicitly consider whether US Airways and or American Airlines was an 
incumbent or potential entrant in each market prior to the merger using the variables 
developed in [14] and used in [12]. An incumbent carrier provides service in the market. 
A potential competitor provides service at one or both endpoint airports of the market 
but does not provide service in the market.  This leads to six situations that are possible 
with a focus on American Airlines and US Airways pre-merger. As in [14], we denote 
the six variables as two-zero, one-one, zero-one, one-zero, zero-two and zero-zero. The 
first number represents whether US Airways and/or American are incumbents followed 
by whether US Airways and/or American Airlines are potential entrants. For example, 
two-zero denotes a market served by both American Airlines and US Airways (and 
therefore neither are potential entrants).  Zero-two stands for a market with neither US 
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Airways nor American Airlines pre-merger providing service but both carriers operating 
at one or both airports that are the endpoints of the market.  
 
The model using OLS, without considering the roles US Airways and American Airlines 
played pre-merger, is as given in Equation (1) below. 
 𝑙𝑛#𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒()*+ = 𝛽. + 𝛽0 ln#𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡()+ + 𝛽7ln	(𝐻𝐻𝐼()*) + 𝛽=𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠() + 𝛽@𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 +𝛽B𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽F𝐿𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽H𝑄7 + 𝛽J𝑄= + 𝛽K𝑄@ + 𝛽0.𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽00𝐿𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 +𝛽07𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽0=𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽0@𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑐𝑡 +	𝛽0B𝑃𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽0F𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒                        
(1) 
 
where 𝑖, 𝑗 denotes the airports that are the origin and destination of the market, 𝑡 is the 
time period (year and quarter); 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒()*  is the airfare form from origin airport 𝑖  to 
destination airport 𝑗 in time 𝑡; 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡() is the distance from airport 𝑖 to destination airport 𝑗. 𝐻𝐻𝐼()* is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index for all carriers that provide service from 
airport 𝑖 to airport j in time 𝑡; 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠()  represent is a binary variable that takes on a value 
of one if either airport 𝑖 or airport 𝑗 or both are slot constrained and is zero otherwise. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is a binary variable that takes on the value of one if the observation occurs after 
the merger and is zero otherwise; 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 is a binary variable that takes on a value of one 
if the carrier is one of the two other legacy carriers (Delta Airlines and United Airlines) 
and is zero otherwise; 𝐿𝐶𝐶 is a binary variable that equals one if the carrier is one of the 
seven low cost carriers and is zero otherwise; 𝑄7,𝑄=, and 𝑄@ are each binary indicator 
variable for the quarter of the year the observation is from and are zero otherwise; 𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝 is a binary variable that is one if the route that is used to service on in the 
market has one intermediate stop. 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝 is a binary variable that takes on the value 
of one when the route has more two or more stops; 𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑐𝑡 is the average number of 
passengers that transfer flights across all airports in the passenger’s literary for their 
carrier; 𝑃𝑜𝑝 is the log of product of the populations at the cities at the end of the market; Income is the per capita income in the city that is the origin for the market.  It is 
important to notice that the impacts of one stop and more than one stop service are 
evaluated in comparison to non-stop service. 
 
The base model is then extended in Equation (2) to measure competition effects as 
follows: 
 𝑙𝑛#𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒()*+ = 𝛽. + 𝛽0 ln#𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡()+ + 𝛽7ln	(𝐻𝐻𝐼()*) + 𝛽=𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠() + 𝛽@𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽B𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔+ 𝛽F𝐿𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽H𝑄7 + 𝛽J𝑄= + 𝛽K𝑄@ + 𝛽0.𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽00𝐿𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡+ 𝛽07𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽0=𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝 + 𝛽0@𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑐𝑡 +	𝛽0B𝑃𝑜𝑝+ 𝛽0F𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽0H𝑃𝑜𝑡()* + 𝛽0J𝐼𝑁𝐶2𝑃𝑂𝑇0()* + 𝛽0K𝐼𝑁𝐶1𝑃𝑂𝑇1()*+ 𝛽7.𝐼𝑁𝐶0𝑃𝑂𝑇2()* + 𝛽70𝐼𝑁𝐶2𝑃𝑂𝑇0()* ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔+ 𝛽77𝐼𝑁𝐶1𝑃𝑂𝑇1()* ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽7=𝐼𝑁𝐶0𝑃𝑂𝑇2()* ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇∗ 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 + 𝛽7@𝐼𝑁𝐶2𝑃𝑂𝑇0()* ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝐿𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽7B𝐼𝑁𝐶1𝑃𝑂𝑇1()*∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝐿𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽7F𝐼𝑁𝐶0𝑃𝑂𝑇2()* ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝐿𝐶𝐶 
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            (2) 
 
where 𝑃𝑜𝑡()* is the number of potential competitors, defined by the number of carriers 
that provide service at airport 𝑖 and/or airport 𝑗 as during time 𝑡 but do not provide 
service from airport 𝑖 to airport j. 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑚𝑃𝑂𝑇𝑛()* are dummy variables focused on the 
role of US Airways and American Airlines pre-merger. They take on a value of one if 
there are m incumbents and n potential entrants from airport 𝑖 to airport 𝑗 during time t. 
While there are 6 variables for each time period of this structure, we only use four of 
them in these models. There are effectively no markets that fit the description of 𝐼𝑁𝐶1𝑃𝑂𝑇0()* and 𝐼𝑁𝐶0𝑃𝑂𝑇1()*, hence they are discarded.  
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RESULT 
The base model and the extended model are fitted using market data in 2011 combined 
with either market data from 2015, 2016, or 2017. The estimated coefficients for the 
base models are provided in Table 1. The results for extended model are given in Table 
2. Coefficients in both baseline and extended models are all highly significant, and are 
consistent over the three years considered post-merger. Coefficients in the base model 
are also consistent with those in the extended model. 
 
Table 1: Base Model 
Variable Year 11-15 Year 11-16 Year 11-17 
Intercept 3.49*** 2.97*** 3.00*** 𝑙𝑛#𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡()+ 0.299*** 0.328*** 0.328*** 𝑙𝑛#𝐻𝐻𝐼()*+ 0.0326*** 0.0512*** 0.059*** 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠() 0.045*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 0.047*** 0.065*** 0.075*** 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.064*** 𝐿𝐶𝐶 -0.199*** -0.183*** -0.182*** 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 0.082*** 0.074*** 0.104*** 𝐿𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.194*** -0.118*** -0.121*** 𝑄7 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.045*** 𝑄= 4.2e_@ 9.7e_=*** 0.01*** 𝑄@ -0.016*** 8.0e_=*** 0.013*** 
OneStop 0.389*** 0.515*** 0.505*** 
Multi-Stop 0.544*** 0.63*** 0.621*** 
passPct (mean) 0.036*** 0.144*** 0.151*** 
Population (log product) -0.019*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
income -9.3e_H*** -5.7e_H*** -5.2e_H*** 
Adjusted R2 0.2674 0.2726 0.2872 
(*,**,***significant at .01, .001 and .0001, respectively) 
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Table 2: Extended Model 
Variables Year 11-15 Year 11-16 Year 11-17 
Intercept 3.34***  2.88*** 2.92*** 𝑙𝑛#𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡()+ 0.307***  0.332*** 0.332*** 𝑙𝑛#𝐻𝐻𝐼()*+ 0.025***  0.048*** 0.056*** 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠() 0.051***  0.035*** 0.037*** 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 0.042***  0.062*** 0.066*** 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 -0.058***  -0.060*** -0.060*** 𝐿𝐶𝐶 -0.19***  -0.179*** -0.177*** 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 0.087***  0.080*** 0.104*** 𝐿𝐶𝐶 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 -0.216***  -0.148*** -0.121*** 𝑄7 0.019***  0.013*** 0.045*** 𝑄= -3.5e_=***  0.010*** 0.010*** 𝑄@ -0.02***  8.4e_=*** 0.015*** 
OneStop 0.378***  0.510*** 0.501*** 
MultiStop 0.531***  0.625*** 0.618*** 
passPct (mean) 0.035***  0.137*** 0.144*** 
Population (log product) -0.015***  -9.7e_=*** -0.011*** 
income -9.1e_H***  -5.3e_H*** -5.0e_H*** 𝑃𝑜𝑡()* -0.013***  -8.3e_=*** -8.8e_=*** 𝐼𝑁𝐶2𝑃𝑂𝑇0()* 0.075***  0.053*** 0.058*** 𝐼𝑁𝐶1𝑃𝑂𝑇1()* 0.093***  0.058*** 0.059*** 𝐼𝑁𝐶0𝑃𝑂𝑇2()* 0.055***  0.020*** 0.018*** 𝐼𝑁𝐶2𝑃𝑂𝑇0()* ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 -0.031***  -0.038*** -0.061*** 𝐼𝑁𝐶1𝑃𝑂𝑇1()* ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 -0.014***  -0.015*** -0.018*** 𝐼𝑁𝐶0𝑃𝑂𝑇2()* ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝑂𝐿𝑒𝑔 0.061***  0.059*** 0.052*** 𝐼𝑁𝐶2𝑃𝑂𝑇0()* ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝐿𝐶𝐶 0.048***  0.023*** -0.011*** 𝐼𝑁𝐶1𝑃𝑂𝑇1()* ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝐿𝐶𝐶 0.051***  0.097*** 0.070*** 𝐼𝑁𝐶0𝑃𝑂𝑇2()* ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝐿𝐶𝐶 0.050***  0.095*** 0.104*** 
Adjusted R2        0.2698       0.2744      0.2817 
(*, **, *** significant at .01, .001 and .0001, respectively) 
 
In the base models and consist with previous studies, the models show that airfare 
generally rises with distance, HHI, number of stops, and slot constraints. They also show 
that fares rose post-merger. A higher HHI indicates less competition and the model 
suggests that this is associated with higher fares. The model coefficients imply that a 
1% increase in HHI is associated with a 3-6% increase in fares. 
 
Also consistent with past studies, airports that operate under slot constraints have fares 
that average about 3-5% higher. The coefficient for 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 provides empirical evidence 
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to suggest that the merger is associated with rising airfares.  The fare increases were 
about 5% higher in 2015 and about 8% 2017 (in comparison to 2011). Regarding the 
impact of hubs, as approximated by the independent variable passPct, empirically they 
are associated with a positive effect on prices and that impact has risen over the three-
year period. It is interesting to note that the coefficients for this variable are substantially 
higher for 2016 and 2017 in comparison to 2015. In 2015 a 1% increase in passPct was 
associated with about a 4% increase in fares. By 2016 that increase was on the order of 
15%. This is likely attributable US Airways and American being in the concluding 
stages of the merger hence their operations were not exactly separate or joined. 
 
Population and income coefficients are negatively correlated with airfares as has been 
observed in other studies [3] [5]. This implies that generally the efficiency gains that 
come with greater air travel offsets the opportunity to raise fares on more economically 
advantaged travelers.  Generally, the quarterly indicator variables show an upward trend 
across three years. Likely this reflects cost increases in the airline industry [20].  Finally, 
each additional potential entrant dampens ticket prices by about 1%.   
 
The pricing impacts on the two other legacy carriers and low-cost carriers by the 
American Airlines and US Airways merger are examined by considering the airfare 
changes derived from the extended regression model. Table 3 gives estimated 
percentage change in price for three years after the merger based on the roles that 
American Airlines and US Airways play in the market pre-merger. 
 
 
Table 3: Change in Fares Relative to 2011 
Carrier Group 2015 2016 2017 
Merged Carrier (AA) 4.29% 6.40% 6.82% 
United/Delta w/o AA/USAir in Mkt 13.77% 15.26% 26.62% 
United/Delta with (2,0) 10.30% 10.96% 11.52% 
United/Delta with (1,1) 12.19% 13.54% 16.42% 
United/Delta with (0,2) 20.92% 22.26% 24.86% 
LCC w/o AA/USAir -15.97% -8.24% -5.35% 
LCC with (2,0) -11.84% -6.11% -6.39% 
LCC with (1,1) -11.57% -1.11% -1.51% 
LCC with (0,2) -11.66% 0.90% 5.02% 
        (incumbent, potential entrant) 
 
 
On routes without American Airlines or US Airway in the market pre-merger, Delta and 
United generally increased airfares over the three years; about 14% in 2015 to nearly 
27% in 2017 compare with 2011.  Notice these increases are substantially higher than 
for the merged carrier. 
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 However, this pricing behavior was not shared by the low-cost carriers in the same 
situations. Their fares dropped about 16% in 2015 compare with 2011. This drop was 
reduced to about 6% in 2017. 
 
When American Airlines and US Airway played a role as either an incumbent or a 
potential entrant in the market, other legacy carriers still increased prices but those 
increases where not as dramatic as when they were not present. Specifically, taking year 
2015 as example, when both American Airlines and US Airways are incumbents, the 
prices increased by about 10% post-merger compare with 2011. In comparison, ticket 
prices increased about twice as much if both carriers were potential entrants. These 
increases in fares persisted and have become larger over the three years from 2015 to 
2017.  As in [12] it is clear that on routes with US Airways and American Airlines as 
incumbents’ pre-merger, price increases on the part of Delta and United that are 
correlated with the merger are lower than when the carriers were potential entrants.  
Further, fare increases were more dramatic on the part of these legacy carriers when US 
Airways and American were neither incumbents nor potential entrants’ pre-merger. 
 
The behavior of low cost carrier’s post-merger is substantially different than for Delta 
and United. When American Airlines and US Airways are both incumbents in the 
market, low-cost carriers reduced prices by 12% and 6% in 2015 and 2017, respectively 
in comparison to 2011. When American Airlines and US Airways were potential 
entrants, the price reductions for low cost carriers were about 12% 2015. This decrease 
did not persist over the three years and by 2017, low cost carrier where US Airways and 
American Airlines were potential entrants’ pre-merger had increased prices by almost 
5% in comparison with 2011. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Similar to other studies, this paper demonstrates that fares tend to be higher in markets 
with lower levels of competition (as measured by HHI), use of airports with slot 
constraints, and where the airports used serve a “hub” like role in the carrier’s network. 
Fares tend to be lower in markets with larger populations and higher incomes.  
 
Consist with the previous studies, this analysis also shows that, the American Airlines 
and US Airways merger was are associated with increases in fares. However, this 
positive association was confined to the merged carrier as well as legacy carriers with 
the magnitude of the increase governed by the role that US Airways and American 
Airlines played pre-merger. For low cost carriers, however there was a decline in prices 
with the magnitude of that decline also governed by the role of US Airways and 
American Airlines pre-merger. Over time the decline in prices for the low cost carriers 
has become smaller and the increase in prices for the merged American Airlines, Delta 
and United has generally not only been sustained but has risen higher. 
 
Our analysis focuses solely on potential competition between legacy and low-cost 
carriers for routes that serve one or both endpoints but do not serve the route itself. As 
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demonstrated in [11], adjacent routes also can have significant impact on pricing by 
acting as a substitute for customers. Thus, it is useful to add adjacent airports into the 
measurement of competition. Moreover, studies have suggested a relationship between 
merger and service quality [3]. Enhanced airline service may lead to improved customer 
satisfaction that directly relates to ticket pricing. Examining this by including level of 
service explicitly into the model is another valuable path worth exploring.    
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